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ON SEEING CHINESE LAW FROM THE CHINESE
POINT OF VIEW: AN APPRECIATIVE LOOK AT
THE SCHOLARLY CAREER OF
PROFESSOR WILLIAM JONES
JANET E. AINSWORTH*
Upon the occasion of a scholar's attaining emeritus status, it is traditional
for others in the discipline to take stock of that scholar's accomplishments,
putting them into perspective in assessing the overall impact that the scholar
has had on the field. It is difficult to overemphasize the contributions of
Professor William Jones to the field of Chinese legal studies. Throughout his,
scholarly career, he has tackled an impressively wide range of topics in both
imperial Chinese law and the contemporary legal system of the People's
Republic of China, covering such disparate subject matter as the statutory
treatment of theft by the legal code of the Qing Dynasty,' a legal
interpretation of the mass campaign in socialist China,2 and an assessment of
the role of trade regulations in the administration of the modem Chinese
state.'
In addition to his prolific output of scholarly articles, Professor Jones has
also authored various translations of Chinese language primary source

materials, including the translations of a recently enacted Chinese civil code,4
a Chinese casebook with commentaries published for use in a Chinese law

school,5 and a collection of Chinese civil law cases.6 His recent translation of
the Qing Dynasty legal code, the Da Qing Lu Li, is truly the crowning

achievement of a lifetime in the field of Chinese legal studies. The first
English language translation of the Code in nearly two hundred years,7 it is a
* Associate Professor of Law, Seattle University; B.A., Brandeis University; M.A., Yale
University; J.D., Harvard Law School.
1. William C. Jones, Theft in the Qing Code, 30 AM. J. COMP. L. 499 (1982).
2. William C. Jones, On the Campaign Trail in China, 5 REV. SOCIALIST L. 457 (1979).
3. William C. Jones, An Approach to Chinese Law, 4 REV. SOCIALIST L. 3 (1978).
4. William C. Jones, A Translation of the FourthDraft Civil Code (June 1982) ofthe People's
Republic of China, 10 REV. SOCIALIST L. 193 (1984).
5. William C. Jones, Civil Law in China, 18 CHINESE L. & GOV'T 7 (Fall-Winter 1985-86).
6. William C. Jones, Collection of Civil Law Cases from the People's Republic of China, 10
REV. SOCIALIST L. 169 (1984).
7. Until Professor Jones's translation was published, the only English language translation
available of the Qing Code was the 1810 edition translated by Sir George Staunton. SIR GEORGE T.
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meticulously crafted version of the Qing Dynasty's central source of law

which, despite the stylistic stiffness inherent in any statutory code,
nevertheless manages to be eminently readable and clear. The extraordinary
nature of this accomplishment may not, however, be fully apparent to the

reader upon casual examination. Classical Chinese texts present enormous
obstacles even for those researchers completely fluent in modem day
Chinese. Written in an archaic style without punctuation and frequently

lacking obvious syntactic or morphological cues to sentence structure,
classical Chinese texts are not so much read as decoded. Add to this the
challenge of choosing English language equivalents for obscure Chinese
imperial legal terminology and one begins to develop an appreciation for
what a remarkable work of scholarship this translation represents.

Generations of scholars will be in his debt for this masterful translation,
which has made the Qing Code a more readily accessible resource to
specialists in Chinese studies as well as to comparative law scholars less

familiar with Chinese law.
In his translation of the Qing Code, as in all of his translations, Professor
Jones demonstrates a keen awareness of the pitfalls that the translator faces in
attempting to forge a linguistic bridge from one language into another.8 No
translation can be an exact equivalent, since the connotations of words are
inevitably changed in the translation.9 When, however, the languages are as

STAUNTON, TA TsING LEU LEE (Ch'eng-wen Publishing 1966) (London, Cadell and Davies 1810).
Staunton's translation is difficult for the modem reader, however, because of changes in English
language usage since the early nineteenth century. In addition, the Staunton text, marred by numerous
errors and spurious readings, has been characterized by Professor Jones as "so free as to be
inaccurate." WILLIAM C. JONES, THE GREAT QING CODE at v (1994). Two French translations of the
Qing Code exist: one a translation of the nineteenth century Annamite Code of Vietnam, which is
substantially identical to the Qing Code from which it was derived; and the other a translation of
portions of the Qing Code, albeit with many provisions truncated or omitted entirely. P.L.F.
PHILASTRE, LE CODE ANNAMITE, NOUVELLE TRADUCTION COMPLtTE (reprint 1967) (2d ed. 1909)
(including a translation of the Vietnamese version of the Chinese Code and of some Qing
commentaries on the Code); LE P. Guy BOULAIS, MANUEL DU CODE CHINOIS (reprint 1966) (1924)
(omitting and abbreviating many Code sections). Neither of these French language translations can be
even remotely characterized as complete or accurate, however, and neither, in any event, is widely
available to comparativists in the United States.
8. Pierre Legrand has criticized comparative legal studies for its general inattention to this
crucial matter of translation. Pierre Legrand, How to Compare Now, 16 LEGAL STUD. 232, 234-35
(1996).
9. The issue of whether, and how, it is possible to transparently transmit the meaning encoded
in one language into a representation in another language can be seen as a philosophical puzzle as well
as a technical linguistic challenge. For the classic treatment of translation as a problem in the
philosophy of language, see WILLARD V.0. QUINE, WORD AND OBJECT (1960) (presenting the
indeterminacy thesis of translation). For a discussion of the technical linguistic issues inherent in
translation, see ROGER T. BELL, TRANSLATION AND TRANSLATING: THEORY AND PRACTICE (1991).
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different as modem English is from classical Chinese, the inherent obstacles
to achieving an accurate translation are compounded."0 This problem is made
even more acute when the legal culture to be represented in translation cannot
be assumed to share our Western notions about law and legal categories.
Western legal terminology, like linguistic categorization in general, is
permeated by the culturally contingent normative content implicit in the
concepts with which the Western legal scholar analyzes and describes a legal
order." For that reason, Jones consciously avoided using legal terminology
"too charged with a precise legal meaning for English-speaking lawyers"' 2 in
his translation of the Qing Code. For example, he chose to use the expression
"fornication with force" where other translators might have chosen the word
"rape" expressly in order to circumvent the normative connotations inevitably
associated with the use of that Western legal and cultural category. 3
The sensitivity to choice of terminology displayed in his translation work
is emblematic of a more general sensitivity to methodology that is a
consistent characteristic of Professor Jones's scholarship. In fact, one could
well maintain that Professor Jones's greatest contribution to the field is
neither his substantive work in Chinese law nor even his authoritative
translations, valuable as both of these bodies of work are. Rather, his most
significant and enduring legacy is the methodological stance that he has
developed towards the study of Chinese law. This stance supplies answers to
three fundamental questions: "Why should we study Chinese law?"; "What
should be included in the study of Chinese law?"; and "How should we
undertake the study of Chinese law?"

10. For further discussion on the problem of commensurability in translation, including aspects
that are unique to the Chinese language, see Achilles Fang, Some Reflections on the Difficulty of
Translation,in STUDIES INCHINESE THOUGHT 263-85 (American Anthropological Ass'n Memoir No.
75, Arthur F. Wright ed., 1953); I.A. Richards, Toward a Theory of Translating, in STUDIES IN
CHINESE THOUGHT, supra at 247-62; Arthur F. Wright, The Chinese Language and Foreign Ideas, in
STUDIES IN CHINESE THOUGHT, supra at 286-303; see also JOHN E. SCHRECKER, THE CHINESE

REVOLUTION IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 200-01 n.9 (1991) (noting that Western languages lack an
adequate vocabulary to translate the Chinese terminology describing features of the social and political
structure of imperial China).
11. Even legal scholarship that appears to be purely descriptive is infused with normative
content. Pierre Schlag, Normativity and the Politicsof Form, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 801, 811-14 (1991).
Schlag investigates the normative aspects of "selecting, establishing, and organizing the so-called
'descriptive' categories deployed in legal thought." Id at 812.
12. JONES, THE GREAT QING CODE, supra note 7, at vi.
13. Id.
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A. Why Study ChineseLaw?
The question of why anyone should study Chinese law is, of course, the
specific analog of the more general question that all comparative legal

scholars must answer: why study comparative law? In recent years,
comparative legal scholars have found that question increasingly difficult to
answer with assurance. An air of malaise hangs over the field of comparative
law, 14 a nagging sense that any proper discipline ought to have a distinctive
methodology as well as an animating raison d'etre; 5 neither of which

comparative legal scholars seem able to agree upon. Comparative law tends
to be defined by its subject matter rather than its methodology-by what is
studied, not how and why it is studied. 6
Partly as a result of this vacuum in methodological justification, a great
deal of comparative legal scholarship seems to be oriented to the needs of
legal practitioners, 7 both those who wish to interact with foreign legal actors
and systems and those who hope to mine foreign legal orders for solutions to
problems that we face in our own society.' The bulk of American scholarship

on Chinese law partakes of this instrumentalist character-not surprising,
perhaps, given the fact that the career trajectories of many Chinese legal

14. William Ewald, ComparativeJurisprudence(1): What Was It Like to Try a Rat?, 143 PA. L.
REV. 1889, 1891-93 (1995). See also Legrand, supra note 8, at 233-34 (quoting various scholars' on
their disappointment with the quality of comparative legal scholarship).
15. Comparative law is not, of course, the only scholarly field beset by methodological anxiety.
Anthropology has likewise been in the throes of what has been called a "crisis" of identity and
methodology. See CLIFFORD GEERTZ, AFTER THE FACT: Two COUNTRIES, FOUR DECADES, ONE
ANTHROPOLOGIST 96-99 (1995).
16. The lack of attention to theory and methodology in comparative law has been blamed for
causing fundamental misconceptions about the nature of non-Western legal systems. See, e.g.,
Bogumila Puchalska-Tych & Michael Salter, ComparingLegal Cultures ofEastern Europe: The Need
for a DialecticalAnalysis,16 LEGAL STUD. 157 (1996); Legrand, supra note 8, at 238 (arguing that "a
commitment to theory [ought to be] paramount if comparative legal studies is to take place in any
credible form").
17. Ewald, supra note 14, at 1953-54 (arguing that much traditional comparative law scholarship
has been designed to be useful to practicing lawyers, though maintaining that it has been largely
unsuccessful on those terms).
18. See, e.g., Christopher J. Whelan, Labor Law and ComparativeLaw, 63 TEX. L. REV. 1425
(1985) (contrasting the uses and misuses of comparative law as an aid to reform our legal system).
Comparativists who are relatively sanguine about the possibility of successfully transplanting legal
practices and institutions from one culture to another lend support to this instrumentalist perspective on
the utility of comparative law. See, e.g., ALAN WATSON, LEGAL TRANSPLANTS: AN APPROACH TO
COMPARATIVE LAW (1974) (arguing that legal institutions and doctrines have been borrowed and
successfully adapted to foreign cultural contexts); cf. Otto Kahn-Freund, On Uses and Misuses of
Comparative Law, 37 MOD. L. REV. 1 (1974) (expressing skepticism about the transferability of
foreign legal systems and practices).
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scholars involve shuttling back and forth between academia and law firm
employment Law firms need definitive answers to questions such as the
following: "What do we need to know to structure a joint venture in China?";
"What protection will our clients have for their trademarks if they do business
in China?"; and "What protections will our clients have in case of breach of
contract by their Chinese counterparts?" American scholars of the Chinese
legal system have obliged them by supplying answers to such questions in
their writings. Less common in American scholarship on Chinese law is the
instrumentalist flip side of the coin-scholarship seeking to derive lessons
from the Chinese legal experience that can profitably be applied to the
American legal order.' 9 Both of these instrumentalist perspectives on the use
of comparative law may be inherently unsatisfying to the scholar, however,
implying that the comparative scholar's role is strictly a supporting role to the
work-a-day world of legal practice; and a bit player at that.
An altemative justification for comparative legal scholarship is that, like
other scholars in the liberal arts academy, the comparativist is adding
incrementally to the world's storehouse of knowledge by carefully cataloging
and preserving data about some aspect of existence, in this case, a foreign
legal system. If the scholar-as-ancillary-to-practitioner role is unsatisfyingly
prosaic, the scholar-as-collector-of-exotic-but-useless-information role is
equally unattractive. Here the comparativist is portrayed as an inconsequential
eccentric, busily adding random facts to the unorganized antheap of human
knowledge, worshipping the "Muse Trivia-the same Goddess who inspires
stamp collectors, accountants, and the hoarders of baseball statistics."2
Those researching issues in Chinese law, like other comparative law
scholars, must confront the question of why anyone should pursue this field.
One way to begin to answer this question is to ask whether scholars of
Chinese law are primarily Sinologists, studying Chinese law in order to learn
more about China, or primarily legal scholars, studying Chinese law in order
to reveal something significant about the nature of law and jurisprudence. Or,

19. This kind of scholarship is premised on the assumption that we Americans have something to
learn from the Chinese legal experience. Perhaps it is the general American sense of cultural
superiority that makes such scholarship uncommon, or perhaps the belief that Chinese law is far less
well-developed and sophisticated than our own. One aspect of Chinese law that has spawned such
scholarship, however, is the Chinese practice of dispute resolution, particularly its mediation
processes. See, e.g., Robert F. Utter, Dispute Resolution in China, 62 WASH. L. REv. 383, 396 (1987);
see also Eric J. Glassman, The Function ofMediation in China: Examining the Impact of Regulations
Governing the People's Mediation Committees, 10 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 460, 461 & n.11 (1992)
(noting that many Western lawyers and legal authorities have visited China to observe Chinese

mediation in action).
20. Ewald, supra note 14, at 1892.
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to put it somewhat bluntly, do scholars of Chinese law belong in Chinese
studies departments or in law schools?2 Of course, the easy answer is that
Chinese legal studies has significance for both academic areas, shedding light
equally on aspects of Chinese culture and civilization and on fundamental
questions about the nature of law. Inevitably, however, one of these two
perspectives must dominate Chinese legal scholarship, with one assuming the
role of figure and the other background.2 2 That is, any particular work of
scholarship in Chinese legal studies must put the primary accent on "Chinese"
or on "legal."
Professor Jones generally puts the accent in his Chinese legal scholarship
on its essential Chineseness rather than its essential legality. For example, in
his translation of a collection of civil law cases from contemporary China,
Professor Jones acknowledges the value of this resource for those interested
in Chinese law. He goes on to say, however, that this
is not their only value: perhaps not even their greatest value. Court
decisions from any country are a terribly rich source of information
about that society.... [They give] one of the very few opportunities
we have to see ordinary Chinese life as it appears to Chinese.
... Cases like these give us a little information about another China,
one that is very hard to learn about anywhere else.23
Similarly, in his introduction to his translation of the Qing Dynasty legal
code, Professor Jones tells the reader that an understanding of the Code is of
"considerable importance for Chinese studies generally,"'24 because an
appreciation that the Code represents "one of the major products of the
Chinese intellectual tradition. . . would cause considerable rethinking of
many presently held views of Chinese thought and civilization."' He does

21. Those of us who write in this area are all too familiar with a variation on this question: Does
this scholarship belong in law reviews or in social science journals? We often answer the question,
however, based not on methodological or disciplinary considerations, but rather on the more prosaic
and self-serving consideration of what placement would most impress our tenure and promotion
committees.
22. The contrast between figure and background in human perception is most apparent in the

context of those familiar optical illusions with two competing interpretations, such as the duck versus
rabbit, the old woman versus young woman, or two faces in profile versus a vase. In these illusions,
the viewer can go back and forth between interpretations by reversing what is seen as figure and what
is seen as background, but cannot simultaneously perceive both images. See generally RICHARD L.
GREGORY, EYE AND BRAIN: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF SEEING 9-14 (3d ed. 1978).
23. Jones, Civil Law in China, supranote 5, at 17-18.
24. JONES, THE GREAT QING CODE, supranote 7, at 28.
25. Id.
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acknowledge that the study of Chinese law is a valuable corrective to the
tendency of comparative legal scholars to focus on European law to the
exclusion of all other legal traditions.26 It is his hope that the study of Chinese
law will be the vehicle through which legal scholars can escape what he calls
"the strait-jacket of Europe-centred thinking."27 Nevertheless, the center of
gravity in Professor Jones's scholarship is in Chinese studies rather than in
jurisprudence.
B. What Is Chinese Law And How Can It Be Recognized?
One of the fundamental questions of comparative law has been described
in this way: "Which legal institutions in what legal cultures can be compared
with each other in a meaningful way?"2 This question cannot be answered,
however, unless first there is an agreement about what counts as a "legal
institution" or "legal practice." In short, the comparative legal enterprise must
first develop a satisfactory answer to the question, "What is law, and how do I
recognize it in a foreign cultural context?" Yet this fundamental question is
given surprisingly short shrift in comparative legal studies. 29 Perhaps one
reason for the lack of attention to this question is that the comparative law
field has traditionally been dominated by scholars concerned with
comparisons between the Anglo-American common law system and the
Roman law-derived civil law system."0 Each of these legal systems emanate
from European societies with a largely shared cultural heritage and a long
history of continued institutional and social contact. Given the cultural
resonances among the various European countries, then, one would expect
that analogous legal concepts and practices would be quite simple to identify
in comparing the European common law and civil law systems. In light of the
obvious parallels in European legal institutions and practices, only the
willfully obtuse scholar of a European-rooted legal system would bother
asking, "What is law, and how will I recognize it?"
When the field of inquiry shifts to China, on the other hand, the familiar

26. Jones notes that comparative law treatises and texts books are virtually silent about nonWestern legal systems. In the eyes of most comparativists, "real law is European law." Id. at 1-2.
27. Id. at 2.
28. Bernhard Grossfeld, Geography and Law, 82 MICH. L. REv. 1510, 1510 (1984).
29. As William Ewald has noted, "[A]ny theory of comparative law will.., have to stake itself
on some conception of law. The problem with the traditional approaches is that they have done so in
silence and indeed without troubling to give the matter much thought." Ewald, supranote 14, at 195 1.
30. Kurt Schwerin, Comparative Law Reflections: A BibliographicSurvey, 79 Nw. U. L. REV.
1315, 1317 (1985).
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landmarks of the civil and common law systems are no longer at hand to
guide our search for "law." One of the hallmarks of Professor Jones's
scholarly writings is his constant awareness of the centrality of this problem."
In probing the interstices of the Chinese legal order, his work always
foregrounds the question, "What is law? And where in the Chinese normative
and social order will I be likely to find it?" Or, to put it another way, "What
am I looking for? And what exactly am I looking at when I think I have found
what I was looking for?" Throughout his scholarly work, whether on imperial
China or socialist China, Professor Jones has insisted that this fundamental
question be the starting point of the inquiry, rejecting a priori assumptions
about what must count, or could not count, as "law." For example, it is
frequently argued that law did not exist during the Cultural Revolution, a
period in which statutes were constructively abrogated, courts shuttered, and
law schools disbanded.32 But, in the view of Professor Jones, such an
interpretation is based on an excessively narrow Western view of what
constitutes "law." Formal law in China, he argues, can be seen as "the central
government's plans and its mechanisms for carrying them out."33 That being
the case, the fact that organized economic activities continued even at the
height of this supposedly "lawless" period suggests that Western observers
are wrong to conclude that law ceased to exist during that time.34 If, as has
recently been suggested, critical legal studies ("CLS") means taking nothing
for granted about the nature of law,35 then Professor Jones must surely be the
godfather of the CLS wing of Chinese legal studies.
In his work, Jones has been consistently skeptical about the utility of using

31. See, e.g., William C. Jones, Reflections on the Modern Chinese Legal System, 59 WASH. U.
L.Q. 1221, 1221 (1982) (noting the importance of being able "to ascertain which phenomena are to be
considered 'law' or 'legal').
32. Paul D. Reynolds, The Role ofLaw in China'sModernisation,POLY L. REV., Autumn 1980,
at 12, 12-13.
33. William C. Jones, Some Questions Regardingthe Significance of the General Provisionsof
Civil Law ofthe People's Republic ofChina, 28 HARV. INT'L L.J. 309, 324 (1987) [hereinafter Jones,

Some Questions].
34. Id. at 330-31. Professor Jones notes:
Even during the most violent period of the Cultural Revolution, 1966-71, grain continued to be
produced, procured, and marketed, fuel got to factories and public utilities, electricity was
produced, trains, ships and planes functioned, and factories continued to operate. They required raw

materials and product distribution. And this meant that there was government direction going on.
The informal system also operated. People got married, died, left property to favorite nephews,
arranged to buy materials for manufacture, etc.

Id
35. Louis E. Wolcher, What We Do Not Doubt: A CriticalLegal Perspective,46 HASTINGS L.J.
1783, 1783 (1995) ("In legal scholarship... being critical means taking very little for granted about
what is discussed.").
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Western categories to describe or analyze Chinese legal practice.3 6
' he unequivocally tells us, and
"Categories of Western law do not work,"37

Western-trained scholars of Chinese law must be constantly on guard for the
unwitting or unconscious importation of Western legal concepts into their
scholarship if we are to understand the Chinese legal order.3" One reason why
Western legal categories are so misleading in the Chinese context is because

Chinese and Western law stem from completely different foundational
premises. Western law, according to Professor Jones, is based on the
assumption that a legal system exists to allow private individuals to make

claims against other individuals or against the state, whereas Chinese law is
based on the assumption that law exists for the protection and promotion of
the interests of the state.39 Consequently, the Western dichotomy between
civil and criminal law, or that between public and private law, simply cannot

be accurately applied in the Chinese context because the fundamental
assumptions driving these dichotomies derive from our Western concepts
about the primacy of the individual's private interests in our legal order.40
Jones warns that one of the dangers in using Western legal categories as
the basis for analyzing Chinese law is that we will tend to concentrate our
attention on those aspects of the Chinese legal order that seem most similar to
our own legal doctrines and practices, regardless of whether these aspects are

36. See, e.g., Jones, Theft inthe Qing Code, supra note 1, at 499, 521. Jones observed that the
Chinese "system is so radically different from anything that we are accustomed to that it cannot be
approached by the use of purely western legal terms," id.at499, and that "the danger that we will be
seeing western concepts and missing Chinese concepts is too great," id.at 521. Accord,JONES, THE
GREAT QING CODE, supra note 7, at 4, 7; William C. Jones, Approaches toChinese Law: A Reply to
Comments by Dr.F.Mrinzel,4 REV. SOCIALIST L. 329, 334 (1978) [hereinafter Jones, A Reply); Jones,
Civil Law inChina,supra note 5,at14-15.
37. JONES, THE GREAT QNG CODE, supra note 7, at 8.
38. See id.
at 14.
39. Il at 4-6. As a result of this distinction, the Western perspective on what law is and how it
functions is precisely inverted from the Chinese view.
Our law has grown outward, as it were, from the concerns of individuals or 'persons'. It fulfils
large social purposes, but it does so indirectly by dealing with the affairs of individuals, largely
from their points of view... As the interests of individuals are served, societal interests get an
indirect benefit.
In China, precisely the reverse was the case. The state promulgated laws to make sure that its
interests were advanced. As this was done, the interests of individuals were often protected as an
indirect result.
Id at 9.
40. Id.at 7. An examination of the structure of the imperial Chinese legal code suggests that our
Western concept of criminal law as opposed to and distinct from civil law is not at all consonant with
the Qing Dynasty's conception of criminal law, since in the Qing Code it was one of six categories, not
one of two. Jones, Theft inthe Qing Code,supra note 1,at 505.
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indeed central in the Chinese legal context.4' Our Western presumptions
about the centrality of private dispute resolution to the legal order, for
instance, will predispose the Western-trained scholar to look for such
practices as contracts and mortgages, and, indeed, similar practices do in fact
exist in China. But they do not occupy the same position of importance in the
Chinese legal order as they do in the West, and consequently ought not be the
central focus of our study.42 Moreover, even when the Chinese legal
institutions or practices at issue are unquestionably important within the
Chinese legal order, their superficial similarity to Western legal concepts may
cause the Western comparativist to misinterpret their meaning within that
order. For example, the elements of crimes as defined in the Qing Dynasty
legal code are remarkably similar to those in the equivalent Western criminal
laws. Yet, Jones cautions us, the concept of "criminal law" inherent in the
Qing Code is fundamentally different from that in Western culture.43 Whereas
Western criminal law sees crime as a violation of the right of individuals to be
secure in their persons and property, the imperial Chinese legal order saw
crime as a disruption of governmental control.' Taking surface similarities
between Chinese and Western law at face value, then, obscures the
fundamental differences that may exist between these two legal orders.
Professor Jones's wariness about imposing Western legal categories on
Chinese law means that he does not assume that institutions or practices that
are clearly central in the Western legal order necessarily occupy a parallel
place in the Chinese legal landscape. For example, Jones concludes that
courts in contemporary China, unlike those in the West, are not central
institutional constituents of the formal legal system, but are instead of only
marginal significance.45 This skepticism towards the utility of Western legal
categories in analyzing Chinese law sometimes leads Jones to identify aspects
of the Chinese legal order that would seem to a Westerner to be non-legal,

41. JONEs, THE GREAT QING CODE, supra note 7, at 8.
42. Jones, A Reply, supra note 36, at 331.
This seems to be a very difficult concept for westerners to accept. That is, that one can have a
society in which there is law-fairly complicated law that cannot be dismissed as custom-and
where there are contracts and mortgages, but where the law is not much concerned with them, They
are what law is all about as far as we are concerned. But not as far as the Chinese were concerned.

Id; accord, William C. Jones, Studying the Ch'ing Code-The Ta Ch'ing L6 L!, 22 AM. J. Comp. L. 330,
356 (1974) (arguing that the rules governing private relations in the imperial legal code were not central to
the Code) [hereinafter Jones, Studying the Ch "ingCode].
43. Jones, Theft in the Qing Code, supra note 1, at 505.
44. Jones, Studying the Ch 'ing Code, supranote 42, at 355.

45. Jones, Some Questions, supra note 33, at 318 ("The courts are not the formal legal system in
China, at least in civil matters. They deal with fringe activities and only in an erratic way.").
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and other times to label seemingly legal practices in China as essentially nonlegal in their Chinese context For example, he suggests that the mass
campaign in socialist China46 can be seen as an aspect of the Chinese legal
order, although most scholars would identify it as a "political" practice rather
than a "legal" one. Where a typical comparative law approach would be
limited to merely looking for similarities and differences between Western
and Chinese trials, Jones went further, transcending the simple application of
the "trial" category to ask what makes trials the kind of normative event that
they are for us in the West. Because he does not begin with Western
preconceptions about what kinds of practices are inherently "legal," Jones is
able to recognize the extent to which the mass campaign serves many of the
same normative functions that publicized litigation serves in the West for the
public dissemination of contests over fundamental values.47
By the same token, Jones's skepticism over the applicability of Western
legal categories to China allows him to interpret seemingly "legal"
institutions and practices as being fundamentally non-legal in the Chinese
context. For instance, he concluded that the enactment of certain statutes in
contemporary China is better understood as a political event than a legal
one.4" A more traditional comparative law approach would assume that
statutes are by definition legal creations, and must therefore be analyzed as a
constituent aspect of Chinese law. The result of "trying to force Chinese
phenomena into Western categories," Jones cautions, is that we may "assume
that the Chinese are doing the Western thing although they are not doing it
'
very well."49
C. How Should We Study Chinese Law?
Because his work is informed to such a great degree by methodological
concerns, Professor Jones recognizes that Chinese legal scholars should

46. The mass campaign, designed to mobilize popular awareness of and support for current
government priorities and goals, has been an enduring feature of political life in the People's Republic
of China. Launched by a central government directive defining its objectives and scope, a mass
campaign is pursued by local government, mass organizations, and the mass media. For a fuller
description of this distinctly Chinese form of mass mobilization, see JAMES R. TOWNSEND, POLITICAL
PARTICIPATION INCOMMUNIST CHINA (1967); and Lucian W. Pye, Mass Participationin Communist
China: Its Limitations and the Continuity of Culture, in CHINA: MANAGEMENT OF A REVOLUTIONARY
SOCIETY 3-33 (John M.H. Lindbeck ed., 1971).
47. See generallyJones, On the Campaign Trail in China, supranote 2.
48. Jones, Some Questions, supranote 33, at 325 ("[T]here is a strong possibility that the General
Provisions were meant primarily as a political statement.").
49. Jones, Civil Law in China, supranote 5,at 14.
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approach their scholarly task cautiously, and with careful regard in
interpreting the significance of what is found. For example, most
commentators on the imperial Chinese legal system have maintained that
many of its characteristics-its emphasis on hierarchical status and on male
dominance over women, for instance-show the influence of Confucian
ideology on the Chinese legal order. Professor Jones, on the other hand,
acknowledges the plausibility of this interpretation, but cautions that the mere
fact that these legal doctrines are consistent with Confucian values does not
necessarily mean that these aspects of Chinese law were actually derived
from Confucian teachings, since traditional European law might appear
equally "Confucian" in its patriarchal characteristics."
Jones maintains that the proper stance for a comparative legal scholar to
take in interpreting Chinese legal culture is one designed to provoke thought
and further investigation rather than hurried, definitive pronouncements about
the nature of Chinese law. It is no accident, then, that Professor Jones's
articles have titles such as Some QuestionsRegarding the Significance of the
General Provisions of Civil Law of the People's Republic of China,5' and
Reflections on the Modern Chinese LegalSystem.52 This is not the pretense of
false modesty sometimes affected by scholars, but a keen recognition of the
inherent tentativeness of any interpretation of the Chinese legal order made
from a Western vantage point.
To truly understand Chinese law for Professor Jones is to see it from the
Chinese point of view.53 Although the imperial Chinese did not leave a body
ofjurisprudence to tell us what they considered to be their fundamental legal
principles,54 they did leave us abundant primary source materials from which
we can attempt to reconstruct their jurisprudence. Professor Jones insists that
these materials can be systematically analyzed to find patterns and structures
that will reveal the coherent body of concepts that constitute the Chinese legal
sensibility." It is this perspective that leads him to the careful analysis of the
Qing Code, looking for its "underlying conceptual structure,"56 that has been
such a prominent feature of his scholarly career. Jones's close textual reading

50. See JONES, THE GREAT QING CODE, supra note 7, at 17.
51. 28 HARV. INT'L L. 309 (1987).
52. 59 WASH. U. L.Q. 1221 (1982).
53. Jones, Theft in the Qing Code, supranote I, at 499.
54. Id.; Jones, Studying the Ch 'ing Code, supranote 42, at 33 1.
55. Jones, Theft in the Qing Code, supra note 1,at 500-01; JONES, THE GREAT QINO CODE,
supra note 7, at 3; see also Jones, A Reply, supra note 36, at 331 (observing that modem Chinese law,
too, should be studied by attempting to discern its common conceptual framework).
56. Jones, Theft in the Qing Code, supranote 1, at 521.
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of the Qing Code concentrates on its structural aspects, with textual
placement of provisions, internal cross-references, and definitions of terms
seen as key to understanding Chinese principles of legal thought.5 7 This
methodology, which is equally applicable to the study of contemporary
Chinese law, assumes that the Chinese legal order has an underlying
coherence that can be reconstructed from a rigorous structural analysis of the
concrete products of the Chinese legal sensibility such as their enacted bodies
of law. Professor Jones's extensive body of work on the Qing Code is an
exemplary example of this methodology in action.
Professor Jones's impressive body of scholarship serves to demonstrate
that sensitivity to issues of methodology is indispensable for the comparative
legal scholar. His work is marked both by an awareness of the
methodological difficulties faced by the comparativist and a confidence that it
nonetheless is possible to transcend these difficulties and make a meaningful
contribution to the development of an understanding of a foreign legal order.
The comparative legal scholar, striving to achieve an intelligible
representation of the Chinese legal order for the reader whose frame of
reference is Western law, must simultaneously preserve the essence of what is
unique and incommensurable in that world and at the same time render it
comprehensible to the outsider looking in."8 In that respect, Professor Jones's
work sets a very high standard for succeeding generations of scholars in the
field of Chinese studies. Without question, his contributions will influence
future generations of scholars following in his footsteps as they devise their
own answers to those three nagging questions-why, what, and how to study
Chinese law.

57. Id. at 506.
58. This is a dilemma shared with historians and anthropologists as well, who must struggle with
the representation of the incommensurable. See DAVID LOWENTHAL, THE PAST IS A FOREIGN
COUNTRY at xvi (1985) ("[L]ife [in the past] was based on ways of being and believing
incommensurable with our own."); Vincent Crapanzano, Hermes' Dilemma: The Masking of
Subversion in Ethnographic Description, in WRITING CULTURE: THE POETICS AND POLITICS OF
ETHNOGRAPHY 51-52 (James Clifford & George E. Marcus eds., 1986) (describing the "paradox" of
the anthropologist who must "render the foreign familiar and preserve its very foreignness at one and
the same time").
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